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Introduction 
 
The Tour de France is one the world‟s largest sports events. The three-week race attracts 10 to 15 
million (non-paying) spectators along the roads each year and individual stages are watched by 15 to 
20 million TV viewers worldwide (see chapter 5).  Although generally cycling races are not lucrative, 
the Tour de France organiser‟s balance sheet reveals that the Tour has always been profitable in the 
past two decades. 
 
How can this attractiveness and the economic success story be explained? Most sports economists are 
used to turn to a contest‟s outcome uncertainty as a first explanatory variable for success. However, 
fans of the Tour de France are not often surprised by the name of the final winner of the race, usually 
not even by the three riders sharing the podium. Nobody needs more than a few riders‟ names to 
predict with great certainty who the winner will be. Thus, explaining Tour de France success by 
outcome uncertainty and its usual metrics in terms of competitive balance must be checked carefully. 
Tour de France attendance and TV audience do not seem to be seriously threatened and surely not 
definitely affected by recurring doping scandals either. This was neither the case after big doping 
issues many decades ago (for example when Tom Simpson died during the climb of the Mont Ventoux 
in 1967), nor in the past twenty years (from the Festina affair in 1998 up to Lance Armstrong being 
stripped from all his Tour de France wins in 2012). Although doping seems not to be an immediate 
threat to the popularity of the Tour de France, it is clear that doping detection and doping sanctions 
have not been efficient and effective enough so far to clean this sport contest from the use of forbidden 
doping substances and practices. This raises the issue of what could be a better way to combat the use 
of doping in the Tour de France or in cycling in general.  
 
The chapter goes as follows. In the first section it is demonstrated how the Tour de France is a high 
quality product. This is a result from its accurate design, its management, its economic model and its 
finance structure, both in comparison to other mega-sporting events and with reference to tournament 
theory. It is not easy to assess the competitive balance in the Tour de France since, as was 
demonstrated in chapter 10, it is at the same time an individual and a team sport contest. After 
reviewing some results published in literature so far, a new metrics for evaluating competitive 
balanced in the Tour de France is presented in section 2. Finally, the Tour de France cannot ignore 
doping as a potential threat to fan attendance and TV viewing. We therefore discuss the issue of 
doping and a new procedure to deal with doping in section 3.  
 
1. A successful managerial and economic model 
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A top sports event offered for free will automatically attract a significant demand. Beyond this basic 
and quite obvious cause of Tour de France attractiveness, its design and management are also 
explanations of its success. As we will show below, the latter may be due, to some extent, to the Tour 
fitting with the recommendations derived from tournament theory and to basically sticking to a 
modern model of professional sport finance.  
 
1.1. A well-designed and well-managed sport event 
 
The Tour de France is managed by Amaury Sport Organisation (ASO). ASO also organises other 
professional cycling races (such as Paris-Roubaix or the Critérium du Dauphiné Libéré) as well as golf 
tournaments, track and field events, car races and horse-riding contests. Professional road cycling 
accounts for close to 70% of ASO revenue, mainly because of the success of the Tour de France 
(Desbordes, 2006). Since ASO is a privately-owned company, it aims at profit maximising and 
designs its strategy accordingly. A first strategic tool consists in multiplying the number of trophies 
within a race. This process started up in 1919 with introducing the yellow jersey and lasted until 1989 
when the number of trophies has nearly stabilised, respectively rewarding the best rider overall 
(yellow jersey), the best climber (polka-dot jersey), the best sprinter (green jersey), the best young 
rider (any rider aged below 25, white jersey), and the best-ranked team. From time to time other 
trophies appeared and vanished again after some years. By creating “different races within the race”, 
ASO attempted and succeeded in making the Tour de France a more vivid contest with multiple 
opportunities for duels between riders or teams competing for a given trophy and changes in the tactics 
adopted by riders or teams during the course of the race. 
 
Two other factors that attract people to see riders on the Tour de France roads are linked together. The 
first one is the riders‟ performance, the second one lies in the hardness of the race. Based on the 
number of racing days and the number of rest days per racing day, the Tour de France became much 
harder after the 1920s with the number of racing days stabilising up to about 20 while one rest day per 
ten racing days became the usual ratio. Before the 1920s the number of stages was usually 15 at most 
and the riders enjoyed at least one day of rest after each stage. The overall riding distance was 2,428 
kilometers in 1903 and rose to a maximum of 5,745 kilometers in 1926. Since then the distance 
shortened to about 3,500 kilometers on average. Thus, compared with the initial era of so-called 
„road‟s convicts‟ (les forçats de la route in French), riders now spend more days on the roads and have 
less often time to rest. However, this has been made feasible by reducing the average stage length from 
over 300 kilometers until 1926 to less than 200 kilometers since the 1960s. Consequently, the average 
duration of a stage, i.e. the time actually spent by riders on their bikes, fell from 10 to 16 hours before 
the 1930s to slightly over 4 hours in the 2000s. The race also became harder due to the introduction of 
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mountain stages. The first mountain ever climbed in the Tour de France was the Ballon d‟Alsace in the 
Vosges region in 1905. A handful of years later, high-mountain stages in the Pyrenees (1910) and the 
Alps (1911) were introduced. However, the number of passes over 1,000 meters in a given Tour de 
France has not increased significantly on average since the 1920s. 
 
Apart from the physical hardness of the Tour de France, it is also the increase in riders‟ performances 
that has made the Tour attractive to spectators. The overall average speed of the yellow jersey winner 
was between 25 and 30 kilometers per hour (km/h) until the late 1930s. Since World War II it has 
steadily increased. From 25.7 km/h in 1903 to 41.7 km/h in 2005 (the fastest Tour ever) is an 
improvement of 62%. Part of this acceleration is due to technical progress affecting riders‟ bikes such 
as the introduction of derailleur gears, the increase in the number of gears, lighter bikes, profiled 
wheels, etc. (Calvet, 1981; Andreff, 1985). Improvement of the road surface, shorter stages, multiple 
stakes and high effort intensity in the crucial parts of the race have also triggered both higher rider 
performance and increased attractiveness to spectators. Improved physical and medical preparation, 
better nutrition, and sometimes doping may have played a role as well. Another index of riders‟ 
performance is the withdrawal ratio, the percentage of riders who do not finish all stages of the Tour 
de France. This ratio decreased from over 70% in the 1920s to 40% in the 1930s and about 20% 
during the 2000s. The highest withdrawal ratio was reached in 1926 (as explained above the longest 
Tour de France ever held) with 126 withdrawals out of 162 riders (77.8%), meaning only 36 riders 
finished the Tour de France that year. In 2009, the lowest withdrawal ratio was recorded with 156 out 
of 180 riders finishing the Tour de France. Only 24 riders (13.3%) abandoned the race. 
 
Last but not least, the Tour de France is a sports event that is supplied for free to millions of spectators 
along the roads. However, the demand for it is not infinite. The demand is rationed by various 
constraints such as the date and location of a stage or the hosting capacity of a geographical site (like 
the slopes of the Mont Ventoux or Alpe d‟Huez), limiting the number of spectators. Nevertheless, 
from an economic point of view, a free sport event is likely to draw a huge attendance. Indeed, 10 to 
15 million spectators per year attend the race over the course of three weeks. This is significantly more 
than the biggest mega-sporting event in the world, the FIFA World Cup with an attendance of 
3,115,800 people in Germany 2006 and 3,224,342 in South Africa 2010. Moreover, since all 
spectators cannot attend the Tour 21 days long, they also demand a story telling which was first 
supplied by newspapers, then through radio broadcasts and eventually through TV broadcasts. 
 
1.2. The financing model of the Tour de France 
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The Tour de France has not always been a profitable business. Until the 1950s, financial deficits were 
common (Reed, 2010). The deficits vanished with rising TV rights revenues. The first Tour de France 
TV broadcast was the finish of the last stage at the Parc des Princes stadium in Paris in 1948 whereas 
the first TV broadcast of a mountain pass was at the Aubisque in 1958. Nowadays, the Tour is the 
major sports event in the French broadcasting market with well over 80 hours of broadcast, ahead of  
the Roland Garros tennis tournament (77 hours), Champions League matches, Formula 1 races and the 
rugby Six nations tournament. In 2013, 24 million French people watched the Tour de France for at 
least one hour on French television, a TV market share of slightly over 30%. In chapter 5 it was 
explained how from the 1970s on the Tour de France was also broadcast in more and more countries. 
Today it is a global mega-sporting event. Over 100 TV channels in 190 countries now broadcast the 
Tour de France, with live broadcast in 60 countries (www.aso.fr). Consequently, the Tour de France 
TV rights revenues have increased significantly over the years. In 1960, the French public TV channel 
started paying TV rights for broadcasting the Tour de France. The French broadcasting rights equalled 
€ 23 million in 2009 (CSA, 2011) and have grown to € 24.9 million in 2013. Although this is 
significant, it is less than the football Champions League broadcasting rights in France (€ 50 million) 
or the French professional football league broadcasting rights over one season (€ 668 million). No 
detailed information on the international TV deals is available, but in chapter 3 it was shown that the 
global broadcasting rights for the Tour de France probably amount to about € 50 million a year. As a 
result, the budget of the Tour de France has literally skyrocketed since the 1980s. From 1980 to the 
late 1990s, the Tour operational budget grew from € 5 million to € 50 million (Mignot, 2013) 
primarily due to the growth of TV rights revenues that multiplied by 65 over the same period of time 
(from € 250,000 to € 16 million). In the past decade, the budget further increased from € 77 million in 
2003 up to € 130 million in 2013.  
 
Table 1 illustrates the financing sources of the Tour de France. Basically, three types of income can be 
distinguished: TV broadcasting rights, merchandising and sponsorship revenue, and income from 
municipalities. The media success story is the basis for the solid economic foundations of the Tour de 
France because it provided 44% of its overall budget in 2010. Just like in other professional sports, TV 
rights are now an important source of revenue, resulting from an organiser‟s strategy of using its 
monopoly power over the Tour de France to increase these rights. From the 1950s to the 1980s two-
thirds of Tour de France revenues originated from merchandising and sponsorship. This kind of 
revenues emerged in 1925-1929 when the Tour had transformed from a race opposing individual 
riders into a race between opponent teams sponsored by trademarks and commercial companies. Since 
1930, additional sponsorship income was generated with the introduction of a publicity caravan, i.e. 
dozens of vehicles preceding the riders by a few minutes and distributing product samples to 
spectators (see chapter 1). The share of advertising and sponsorship revenue has declined in the past 
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two decades to 51% of the budget in 2010. Finally, each year over 200 cities are a candidate for 
hosting a Tour de France stage arrival and/or departure and those who are successful pay between € 
50,000 and € 100,000 for this privilege. However, because of the rising overall budget the share of the 
contributions from these cities in the total budget of the Tour de France has decreased from 40% in 
1952 to 5% in 2010. 
 
Table x.1 Financing sources of the Tour de France and professional football  in 2010 
    
Revenue source Tour de France English Premier French football 
(in % of overall finance)   League football Ligue 1 
TV broadcasting rights 44 51 57 
Merchandising & Sponsorship 51 22 28 
Municipalities 5 0 2* 
Spectators (gate revenue) 0 27 13 
 
* Municipal subsidies 
 
 
The Tour de France has thus also evolved towards a contemporary model of professional sports 
finance and developed from a so-called SSSL (= Spectators, Subsidies, Sponsors, Local) model to a 
MCMMG (= Media, Corporations, Merchandising, Markets, Global) model with regard to its major 
sources of finance (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). In the MCMMG model, media, in particular through 
TV broadcasting rights, have become a significant source of income for many sports. Furthermore, 
alongside with sponsors and gate receipts (spectators) whose share in overall finance of sports events 
has shrunk, new sources of finance have emerged including corporations (investment funds, big 
companies, Russian oligarchs, Middle Eastern sheiks enriched by oil sales, …), merchandising of non 
sporting goods (e.g. T-shirts) under a club‟s or a player‟s label, and markets. With respect to the latter, 
we see that money is channeled into contemporary professional sports from two markets: a labour 
market for talent in which a club makes money in selling home-educated and trained talented players 
and a capital market that enables to trade a club‟s shares at the stock exchange and collecting money 
from the fans as shareholders. Most of these new sources of finance are global. 
 
From table 1 we also see that although the current Tour de France financing model is in line with big 
professional sports leagues such as the football English Premier League and the French Ligue 1, it 
remains specific in a way too. For example, its TV-dependence is slightly lower in percentage of 
overall revenues compared to football and merchandising and sponsorship (51%) is still a more 
important source of income to the Tour de France organisers than TV rights revenues. This may be 
interpreted as either the Tour de France being in a transition phase between the SSSL and MCMMG 
models, or as a consequence of the absence of gate revenue which must be compensated for by 
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sponsorship money. In fact, the lack of gate revenue potentially deprives the Tour de France of up to a 
quarter (like in English football) of overall revenues. The share of public money received from 
municipalities is more important in the Tour de France than in European football though it is now 
reduced to 5% only. At the end of the day, the profitability of the Tour de France is likely to be 
guaranteed as long as it will attract media, advertisers and sponsors even without any spectatorship 
income.  
 
1.3. The Tour de France and tournament theory 
 
A more theoretical reason may explain why the Tour de France is such a successful sport contest. The 
tournament theory (Tullock, 1980) was first conceived for analysing the efforts dedicated by 
competing job seekers to get a job and was then adapted to sporting contests, namely tennis 
tournaments (Rosen, 1986). Each participant is assumed to independently choose the quantity of 
resources (physical efforts) he is going to invest in view of winning the tournament and receiving the 
winner‟s prize. His winning probability increases with this quantity. Let V stand for the value of the 
winner‟s prize and n the number of competing participants. Each participant i dedicates an effort ei and 
his probability of winning pi depends on his share in the overall effort devoted by all participants that 
is: 
                                        
The financial gain of participant i is:    i = pi V – ci ei
m
     
where ci stands for marginal cost of each participant i‟s effort or investment in the tournament and m is 
a parameter that measures the power of the tournament to discriminate across competing participants, 
i.e. m indicates how much one unit of competitor i‟s effort increases his winning probability.  
 
The assumption that the organiser of a sport tournament acts profit maximising implies that the goal is 
to attract as many spectators as possible by gathering high quality athletes and by securing that these 
athletes dedicate maximal efforts to win. Therefore the organiser must conceive incentives in such a 
way that athletes maximise their efforts and, consequently, produce a spectacular sporting event. From 
tournament theory it is mathematically derived (Szymanski, 2003; Andreff, 2012) that: 
a/ When one competitor has a very high capacity to win, the tournament practically is without interest 
for other participants who will dedicate only a minimal effort. The organiser must avoid such a 
competitive imbalance. 
b/ Individual effort and aggregated effort of all the participants increase with the value of the winner‟s 
prize V. 
c/ Individual effort decreases with the number of participants. 
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d/ Aggregated effort increases with the number of competitors. 
e/ Participants‟ efforts are more intense in a tournament with multiple prizes, where there are several 
prizes or trophies at stake, as soon as the competitors‟ abilities to win are different. 
f/ The effort will be more intense the wider the gap between the winner‟s prize and the prize rewarding 
the runner-up, and the wider the gap between the prize for the runner-up and the prize rewarding the 
third ranked rider, and so on. This is particularly true when the differences between the competitors‟ 
winning abilities are small. 
 
As ASO indeed aims at making a profit from organising the Tour de France, the choice of an 
appropriate incentive mechanism is crucial. Most of the prerequisites for a successful and attractive 
sport contest are fulfilled by the Tour de France. By inviting a peloton of about 200 riders, ASO fulfils 
the precondition (d). If ASO intended to further increase the number of riders, it could deteriorate the 
condition (c) of tournament theory. Anyway, the maximum number of riders engaged in a professional 
cycling race is regulated by the international cycling federation. The only trade off open to ASO is 
between more teams with fewer riders each and fewer teams with more riders each. At the end of the 
day, the organiser chooses the number of teams and which teams are selected to participate in Tour de 
France each year. As described in chapter 2, this is not without conflicting interests between the 
organisers of the „grand tours‟ (ASO, RCS and Unipublic) and the UCI claiming that all the Pro Tour 
teams must be invited in each „grand tour‟ (Rebeggiani & Tondani, 2008). Total prize money in the 
Tour de France is now over € 2 million (for a detailed analysis, see chapter 3) which, compared with 
other cycling races, is rather fulfilling the prerequisite (b). Since the prize money is distributed over 
multiple trophies, condition (e) is satisfied as well. Only condition (a) is debatable when one witnesses 
a rider winning the Tour de France five times like Jacques Anquetil, Eddy Merckx, Bernard Hinault 
and Miguel Indurain, or, in the case of the later disqualified Lance Armstrong, seven times in a row. 
Condition (a) is not valid either when the yellow jersey winner is too much ahead of the second-
ranked rider, like in 1952 when Fausto Coppi won the Tour de France with a lead of over 28 minutes. 
In fact, condition (a) raises the issue of competitive balance in the Tour de France which is discussed 
in section 2 below. Finally, prerequisite (f) refers to the distribution of Tour de France prize money 
across different trophies and best-ranked riders. In the 2014 Tour de France, for every lower position 
in the general classification the prize money was more or less halved between the first seven ranked 
riders: from € 450,000 for the winner over € 200,000 for the runner-up to € 100,000 for the third 
ranked rider, and so on to € 11,500 for the rider ranked in seventh place. A similar gap is assessed as a 
strong effort incentive in most individual sports tournaments such as, for example, tennis. With this 
incentive prize structure a rider who jumps from the seventh to the fifth rank multiplies his financial 
gains by four and the same occurs when a rider jumps from the third to the first
 
place. The prize 
structure for winning a stage is similar with also approximately a doubling of the monetary reward for 
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one rank improvement between the four best ranked riders. The prize structure for the other trophies is 
less in tune with tournament theory. In the race for the green, the white and the polka-dot jerseys, 
financial gains are not doubled when a rider improves his rank by one. These trophies thus clearly 
have a less incentive prize structure. If one ASO objective is to “multiply the races within the race” 
this must not go as far as disturbing the contention for the yellow jersey. That is the reason why 
incentives are significantly lower (€ 25,000 for the green and polka-dot jersey winners, € 20,000 for 
the white jersey winner) and less structured according to the tournament theory for trophies that only 
appeal to specialised riders like sprinters or climbers.  
 
It should be remarked though that this focus on prize money is not always relevant in the context of 
cycling races. There are significant indirect financial and non-financial gains too from winning, such 
as a salary increase and fame. Since, as was shown in chapter 3, to an individual cyclist salaries are 
much more important than prize money, this incentive could be higher than the pure prize money. 
 
2. Is competitive balance an explanation for the Tour’s attractiveness? 
 
When economists attempt to explain a successful attendance and/or TV audience for a sports event, 
they are used to refer to competitive balance. Applying this concept to professional road cycling is not 
evident but in chapter 12 this issue is discussed in detail. An introduction to competitive balance in the 
Tour de France and a new tentative metrics is presented here.  
2.1. Competitive balance and professional road cycling 
Outcome uncertainty is at the heart of sports economics (Rottenberg, 1956; Neale, 1964). When a big 
gap between the aggregated players‟ talent of two teams is witnessed, there is a quite low probability 
to win for one team while the other is nearly certain of winning. In such a case, outcome uncertainty is 
negligible and the game exhibits a competitive imbalance or a weak competitive balance. If, by chance 
and as it happens sometimes, the underdog defeats the favourite team, the outcome will be assessed as 
a „surprise‟. However, the notion of a surprising sporting outcome is still in the cradle (M. & W. 
Andreff, 2014). A similar approach is used to assess the outcome uncertainty of a sport contest or a 
sports league. Sports economists often assume and then attempt demonstrating that a balanced sport 
contest or game does attract big audiences while a low attendance signals a weak competitive balance. 
This view has been mitigated in recent years. A distinction between two types of sport show 
consumers has been successfully tested. On the one hand, fans and season ticket holders basically 
expect the greatest possible number of wins from their favourite team and thus care less about 
competitive balance. On the other hand, TV viewers and casual spectators often care less about the 
winning team and are attracted by more balanced games. For example, for NBA basketball it has been 
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shown that fans wish at least two-thirds of wins for their favourite team (Rascher & Solmes, 2007). 
This differentiation in the product market for sport shows has recently been integrated in a 
disequilibrium model of a team sports league (Andreff, 2014a). 
 
Taking the audience interest as a benchmark, the Tour de France would definitely be considered to be 
a well-balanced competition given its 10 to 15 million people attendance. But since this sport show is 
offered for free, such a conclusion might be misleading. If one wants to really test the concept of 
competitive balance, a next issue is to develop an accurate metrics. With team sports, the theoretically 
best competitive balance for a game is when both teams have a 50% probability of winning. The most 
used proxy for this probability consists of comparing the win percentages of the two teams and, for the 
league as a whole, of designing some sort of win dispersion or concentration indices (Andreff, 2012; 
Groot, 2008), the most famous being the Noll-Scully index. These indices are static as they pertain to 
just one game or one season. A dynamic competitive balance index refers to several seasons in a row 
or, in the case of Tour de France, to several consecutive years. Usually dynamic competitive balance is 
measured by looking at a rank correlation coefficient across seasons.  
 
The only (albeit serious) problem with aforementioned indices is that just like any other cycling race, 
the Tour de France is not a bilateral confrontation between two teams or two riders and the 
competitive balance indexes for team sports league thus cannot be applied as such. One cannot derive 
and calculate a win percentage between, for example, Team Sky and Movistar from their performances 
in previous cycling races since their sporting outcomes are not the result of a bilateral confrontation 
but of an overall series of contests with many other cycling teams. Since it is not possible to define 
bilateral win percentages, another metrics has to be developed. This is all the more the case because 
road cycling is at the same time an individual sport and a team sport. There is just one yellow jersey 
winner but all riders are grouped into teams and no one can win the yellow jersey without the work 
and effort from his teammates. Moreover, given the multiple trophies that are at stake, two or more 
teams often divide labour and co-operate (sometimes collude) in view of winning a specific trophy. 
Such division of labour usually alleviates competition, influences the competitive balance, and if it 
happens too frequently, may offset the organizer‟s incentives to solicit more effort from the riders. 
 
 2.2. How imbalanced is the Tour de France? 
 
Mignot (2013) uses two indexes of Tour de France outcome uncertainty. The first one measures how 
many times the yellow jersey has switched from one rider to another, divided by the number of racing 
days. This index was rather stable until 1939 then peaked up during the 1950s and remained high since 
then. A second index is the final time difference between the yellow jersey winner and the second-
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ranked rider. This difference was often over one hour during the 1920s but it has been reduced in the 
past decades to some minutes or even only a few seconds. Based on this criterion, we find extremely 
balanced Tours in 1989 (when Greg Lemond won 8 seconds ahead of Laurent Fignon), in 2007 (23 
seconds between Alberto Contador and Cadel Evans), in 1968 (38 seconds between Jan Janssen and 
Herman Van Springel) and in 1987 (40 seconds between Stephen Roche and Pedro Delgado). The 
same benchmark exhibits very imbalanced Tours in 1952 (28 minutes and 17 seconds between Fausto 
Coppi and Stan Ockers), in 1948 (26 minutes 16 seconds between Gino Bartali and Briek Schotte), in 
1951 (22 minutes between Hugo Koblet and Raphaël Geminiani) and in 1969 (17 minutes and 54 
seconds between Eddy Merckx and Roger Pingeon). Although this index thus seems to indicate that 
the Tour de France was less balanced until the late 1960s and became much more balanced since the 
1980s, this conclusion might be a bit misleading. First of all, it relies on comparing two riders only 
and therefore is not robust. Second, within stage time differences were much more pronounced in the 
1940s and 1950s than in recent decades, making it very awkward to use time differences to compare 
competitive balance over time.  
 
The dynamic equivalent of the above criterion would be to check the same rider winning several Tours 
de France in a row like Louison Bobet (1953-55), Jacques Anquetil (1961-64), Eddy Merckx (1969-
72), Bernard Hinault (1978-79 and 1981-82), Miguel Indurain (1991-95) and Lance Armstrong (1999-
2005). Although this leads to the impression that the Tour is very imbalanced, the conclusion relies on 
the performance of only one rider, making it even less robust than above. Nevertheless, it means that 
one feature often associated with outcome uncertainty, namely an unforeseeable sporting result (Neale, 
1964) is missing or really weak in Tour de France.  
 
A common limitation to all previous indexes is that they assess competitive balance only on the basis 
of one or two riders or, at maximum, of a small number of riders in contention for the yellow jersey as 
with Mignot‟s jersey switching index. They give neither any idea of a team‟s strength nor of the 
overall dispersion or concentration of strengths in the peloton. One step further therefore is to find a 
ranking during the pre-Tour de France cycling season that may represent the respective strengths of 
different teams. Rogge et al. (2013), when testing the efficiency of Tour de France cycling teams, used 
the number of cycling quotient (CQ) points obtained by the riders selected for the Tour de France as 
earned on the eve of the Tour. Individual CQ rider values collected from the CQ website 
(www.cqranking.com) are subsequently aggregated into a team score. In the same vein, a calculation 
of cumulative points obtained for the UCI ranking on the eve of the Tour by a team‟s selected riders 
has been used for approximating the collective strength of this team (Andreff, 2014b). Since this index 
correlates well with team performances, UCI points are a rather satisfying index for predicting Tour de 
France outcomes. For example, the best UCI-ranked team has won the yellow jersey in 2012 and 2013 
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and the green jersey in 2011 while the weakest teams have practically no chance to win any trophy. 
The latter participate in the Tour with a single hope and objective: win at least one stage. Though 
interesting as one of the variables that explain team efficiency and performance in Tour de France, 
UCI and CQ rankings do not actually compare with usual indices of competitive balance in team 
sports.  
 
Since the Tour de France can be considered to be a team sport contest basically, below we build 
indexes that resemble the indexes used in sports economics to assess competitive balance of team 
sports leagues. These indexes should neither be based on the performance of one or two riders, nor on 
recurring wins of a single rider or even on the past potential strength of teams like the aforementioned 
indexes and rankings. They must instead account for the actual strength of the complete team in the 
Tour de France and be based on dispersion or concentration indicators, as is common in competitive 
balance literature. The actual strength chosen here is the cumulative time spent by all team members to 
ride the complete Tour de France divided by the number of riders of the team that actually finished the 
race and thus did not abandon. Let us call this index the team’s actual average time performance. 
Table x.A1 in the appendix to this chapter shows for the 2007-2013 period the teams‟ average times, 
expressed in time lags behind the fastest team of that year. This allows to rank teams on the basis of 
their actual strengths over 21 racing days. Note that the fastest team is not necessarily the yellow 
jersey‟s one. This happens only twice (2008 and 2009) in seven years. The fastest team is sometimes, 
but certainly not always, the first ranked team in the Tour‟s team classification calculated on the times 
achieved by the best three team members in each stage. This happens three times (2008, 2012 and 
2013) out of seven years.  
 
Now, if m1, m2, …, mn stand for all teams‟ actual average times (with n the number of teams), then we 
can determine the actual average team time for the whole peloton (as follows:  
  = (m1 + m2 + … +  mn) / n 
We define  as the standard deviation of the distribution of all actual teams‟ average times around the 
mean . The standard deviation is a potential index of competitive balance. For example, one can 
compare for Tour de France 1 to for Tour 2 and conclude from that Tour 1 is more 
balanced than Tour 2 since the teams‟ strengths are more closely matched in the former than in the 
latter.  
 
Remind that the famous Noll-Scully index compares the actual standard deviation of win percentages 
to a theoretical optimal one, the best possible competitive balance when all teams have à 50% 
probability to win. What would be the best Tour de France competitive balance? It is obvious that 
when  = 0 all teams have shown exactly the same strength. However such perfect competitive 
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balance is as much theoretical as the Noll-Scully benchmark of all teams having an equal 50% 
probability to win. Its practical interest is limited in the real world. Another index is required to 
qualify how much one specific Tour de France is balanced or imbalanced. Here two options exist. One 
is to refer to the coefficient of variation  = . A statistical distribution is considered as extremely 
scattered (i.e. the Tour is extremely imbalanced) when ≥1, and the closer to zero the less it is 
scattered. As a benchmark  may be accepted for concluding that a Tour is balanced. A second 
option is to compare the observed distribution of team‟s actual average times with a Gaussian (or 
normal) distribution. In the latter, 68.3% of the population is contained between and . If for 
a given Tour de France the number of teams comprised within this interval is smaller than 68.3%, not 
only the Tour is imbalanced but it must be assessed as abnormally imbalanced since teams‟ strengths 
are less concentrated in the central part of the distribution than in a Gaussian population. Such an 
imbalanced situation could result from having too many weak teams participating in the Tour de 
France. Conversely, if the number of teams in the above interval is bigger than 68.3%, then the Tour is 
less imbalanced than it would have been under the conditions of a Gaussian distribution.   
 
Table x.2 presents the values of the static competitive balance indexes for the Tour de France editions 
from 2007 to 2013. With regard to , the 2011 Tour is the most balanced one (when runner-up Andy 
Schleck was 1‟34” behind Cadel Evans) while the least balanced one is the 2013 Tour (when Nairo 
Quintana finished 4‟20” behind Christopher Froome). The 2007 edition is one of the least balanced 
Tours despite a tiny 23” time lag between Alberto Contador and Cadel Evans. According to the 
coefficient of variation  all Tours de France were clearly imbalanced with a value between 0.45 and 
0.63, quite over the 0.2 benchmark. The most imbalanced were 2011 and 2012 with values of at least 
0.61. Overall, competitive balance seems to deteriorate over time when comparing the values of  in 
2007-2008 and in 2011-2013.  
 
Table x.2 Static competitive balance in the Tour de France, 2007-2013   
   
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
n : number of teams 19 19 20 22 21 22 22 
 : mean 4238.5 3049.5 3340.8 3063.6 1899.9 2715.7 3704.3 
 : standard deviation 2071.8 1386.2 1847.8 1695.8 1139.5 1706.2 2113.5 
: coefficient of variation 0.49 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.63 0.57 
 2166.7 1663.3 1493.0 1707.8 760.5 1009.5 1590.7 
 6405.1 4712.9 4833.8 5111.5 2660.4 3725.2 5295.0 
number of teams <   4 3 4 4 2 3 3 
number of teams >   3 1 2 3 5 5 6 
teams within () 12 15 14 15 14 14 13 
% teams within () 63.2 78.9 70.0 68.2 66.7 63.6 59.1 
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The 2010 Tour de France with a 68.2% of teams within the (; ) interval has a nearly 
Gaussian distribution of teams‟ strengths and can be taken as a benchmark. Several Tours (2007, 2011, 
2012 and 2013) concentrate a smaller percentage than 68.3% in the same interval and are abnormally 
imbalanced compared with a Gaussian population. The 2008 and 2009 Tours are less than Gauss-
imbalanced with a percentage of teams within the interval higher than 68.3%. Overall, the 2008 and 
2009 Tours were the least imbalanced while the 2007 and 2013 Tours were the most imbalanced.  
 
The above indexes are static indicators of competitive balance. A concept of dynamic competitive 
balance is developed using Spearman rank correlation coefficients (rs). The correlation coefficients are 
calculated between each couple of different Tours de France between 2007 and 2013 and the ranking 
of the teams is based on their average times (see table x.A1). If according to their strengths (average 
times) all the teams are exactly ranked in the same order for two different Tours then rs = 1. The 
outcome of the second Tour in terms of team ranking can be predicted with 100% accuracy when one 
knows the Tour team ranking of the first Tour. There is no outcome uncertainty over time and the 
sport contest is perfectly imbalanced over time. On the other hand, if rs = 0 or has a very low value, 
the correlation between two Tours‟ team rankings is not significant. One cannot accurately predict the 
team ranking of the second Tour based on the team ranking of the first Tour. There is outcome 
uncertainty and there is a significant amount of dynamic competitive balance.  
 
Table x.3 summarizes the results. Most rank correlation coefficients are low and statistically 
insignificant. This is partly due to the turnover in invited teams which sometimes leaves only a small 
number of teams comparable between each couple of Tours de France. For example, only 9 teams 
participated in both the 2007 and 2013 Tour de France. It should be noted though that in consecutive 
years, this number is often much higher. In fact, in the 2012 and 2013 Tour de France precisely the 
same 22 teams took part. There are few exceptions to the above conclusion of statistically insignificant 
correlations. We find correlations significant at the 5 or 10% level between the Tours of 2007 and 
2009, between the Tours of 2007 and 2010, between the Tours of 2008 and 2009, and between the 
Tours of 2009 and 2010. But the highest correlation, with a 1% statistical significance, is between the 
2007 and 2008 Tour de France. In these years of post-Armstrong domination, some teams like CSC / 
Saxo Bank, Caisse d’Epargne and Euskaltel fielded strong squads two years in a row and were twice 
ranked among the best 5 teams (measured in average team time). Other teams like Gerolsteiner, 
Barloworld and Française des Jeux performed much worse in 2008 and 2009 and belonged twice to 
the worst performing teams. 
 
 15 
 
Table x.3 Spearman rank correlation between Tour de France average team time rankings, 2007-
2013 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2008 0.62*** (16)       
2009 0.53* (13) 0.55** (16)      
2010 0.50* (12) 0.35 (15) 0.43* (18)     
2011 -0.02 (9) 0.24 (11) -0.08 (13) 0.20 (16)    
2012 -0.55 (9) -0.04 (11) 0.26 (14) -0.09 (16) 0.19 (19)   
2013 0.27 (9) 0.21 (11) 0.19 (14) -0.14 (16) 0.14 (19) 0.10 (22) 
 
Between brackets: the number of teams common between two Tours de France 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
This leads to a major conclusion. When multiple years are considered, the Tour de France generally 
shows a dynamic competitive balance, with uncertainty and unpredictability. However, when just one 
Tour is considered, the Tour de France rather exhibits a static imbalance. This implies that in the 
course of the race it is rather predictable what teams will perform the best, but from one Tour to the 
other the outcome is much more unpredictable due to team changes, team recruitment, the selection of 
riders for the next Tour, and the resulting team performance. One could therefore conclude that 
although each Tour is a new story, for each story the scenario is rather well known to the spectators. 
Nevertheless, the Tour still attracts tens of millions of people along the roads and in front of television 
sets. This confirms earlier observations in sports economics research that questioned the importance of 
competitive balance as the main determinant of viewership interest for a sports event. 
 
3. Doping did not hinder Tour de France success, but could it be fought better? 
 
The Tour de France success story has not been disturbed too much so far by its long-lasting 
association with doping, not even by the doping troubles of the past decade. Does this mean that 
doping has no impact on the Tour outcome? Or that fans and spectators are unaware of doping? Or 
that the anti-doping combat has become so effective that doping use is actually on its way down within 
the peloton? Doping in cycling is discussed in detail in chapter 13. An introduction to doping in the 
Tour de France and an innovative procedure to better deal with the use of doping is presented below.  
 
3.1. Doping: an unobservable determinant of the Tour de France outcome 
 
It is very difficult to empirically test the impact of doping on the outcome of a sports contest since 
there is no available database about who is doped or not in a team, in a sport, or in the Tour de France. 
As a consequence, the above used competitive balance indexes as well as the analyses of sporting 
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success determinants (Torgler, 2007) or team efficiency (Rogge et al., 2013) in the Tour de France, are 
for certain distorted to an unknown extent. In fact, they do not include an explanatory or dummy 
variable supposed to capture the doping effect on rider and team performances. For example, the 
estimated probability to be ranked among the first 25 riders for the yellow jersey trophy calculated by 
Torgler (2007) is substantially disturbed by the ex post disqualifications of Lance Armstrong and other 
doping-connected events. It is all the more strange that most empirical studies about the Tour de 
France do not even mention doping or do not give a reason why this unobservable, or hardly 
observable, variable is not taken into account. One can find more about the data and methodological 
limitations that hinder using a doping variable in a model explaining the distribution of Olympic 
medals across nations in Andreff et al. (2008). 
 
The Tour de France and doping have a long-lasting intertwined history. Doping has heavily influenced 
and distorted the outcome of the Tour de France for many decades. In 1960, Roger Rivière fell from 
his bike when riding down the Perjuret pass. His dizziness was assumed to be the result of the 
consumption of palfium pills. Disaster struck in the 1967 Tour de France when Tom Simpson died 
during the ascent of the Mont Ventoux. His death was attributed to a combination of exhaustion and 
doping abuse (amphetamines). The situation certainly did not improve during the 1970s. Bernard 
Thévenet, the 1975 and 1977 Tour winner, later admitted he used cortisone. Michel Pollentier was the 
first yellow jersey wearer disqualified for doping. He was excluded from the 1978 Tour de France 
when he tried to cheat in a doping test. Joop Zoetemelk, the 1980 Tour de France winner, is the only 
rider to have tested positive no less than three times during the Tour de France: in 1977, in 1979 and in 
1983. He mostly escaped punishment and was only sanctioned with time penalties and small fines. In 
1988 yellow jersey wearer Pedro Delgado controlled positive for the use of probenicid, but was not 
excluded. Although the substance was on the IOC list of prohibited products, it was not on the UCI list 
of prohibited products. Mass industrialised doping penetrated cycling and the Tour in the 1990s. The 
use of epo became widespread. This became known to the general public as a result of the Festina 
doping scandal in the 1998 Tour de France. But the Festina scandal did not end doping in the Tour de 
France. In fact, the worst was yet to come. The 1998-2010 period can easily be qualified as the darkest 
period ever for the Tour de France. With the ex post disqualifications of Armstrong, Landis and 
Contador, the Tour lost nine out of its twelve final yellow jersey winners between 1999 and 2010.  
 
Despite the overwhelming evidence on doping, the Tour de France audience has not dropped over the 
years. A recent inquiry in Flanders (Van Reeth & Lagae, 2014) however, did show that most 
spectators do prefer “clean” performances in the Tour over doping-prone exceptional results. The 
study shows they are well aware of doping that plagues the Tour de France. But although they think 
that it is a problem that will never disappear completely from cycling and thus will continue to affect 
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its credibility, cycling fans do not refrain from attending or watching it on TV, as another study (Van 
Reeth, 2013) has demonstrated. A new doping case during the Tour de France appears to have no 
significant immediate impact on average TV audiences of the Tour de France and triggers a small 
7.6% decrease in peak TV audiences. However, the impact of doping seems to have a stronger impact 
in the year following the unveiling of a major doping case, like the Festina case in 1998 or the 
Contador case in 2012. A significant 17.5% decline in average TV audience and a 7.7% fall in peak 
TV audience is recorded for the following Tour de France. This impact seems to temporary though 
since the effect only lasts for one year. Although apparently it has not strongly affected Tour 
attendance and TV audiences so far, doping may still be damaging the Tour success story in the long 
run. This requires new ideas on how to combat doping in cycling more efficiently. 
 
3.2. How to combat doping more efficiently?  
 
Anti-doping policy is still very much inspired by a traditional view on doping. In this vision, doping is 
considered to be fraudulent behaviour and therefore must be analysed based on the theory of the 
“economics of crime” (Becker, 1968), as it has been applied to sports (Bourg, 2000; Maennig, 2002). 
Detection and sanctioning is then validated by an argument that runs as follows: a/ since it is forbidden 
by law, doping is fraudulent, and must be controlled; b/ since doping is profitable for an athlete in 
terms of wins and revenues, even it is forbidden athletes are prone to use it; c/ in order to stop doping, 
its costs to the athlete must be raised through stronger sanctions (fine, suspension, …) up to a level 
where it is no longer profitable to dope. In the end, an athlete makes the decision to dope if the 
expected net gain is positive, i.e. if the extra benefits (revenue, fame, …) that can be expected from the 
use of doping exceed the costs of using doping (actual costs and expected costs of sanctions if caught). 
 
A new analytical approach to doping in sports economics relies on game theory. The starting point is 
to basically assume that riders dope themselves because it corresponds to their deeply rooted economic 
and financial interests, and not because they are bad by nature, professional cheaters or criminals. Two 
papers written in the wake of the Festina scandal (Eber & Thépot, 1999 and Berentsen, 2002) analyse 
doping as a result of a prisoner‟s dilemma, one of the most famous problems in game theory. In a 
nutshell, the doping game is a prisoner‟s dilemma adapted here to cycling where: a/ there is a 
(financial and health) cost borne by riders when they use  doping; b/ the use of doping substances and 
techniques enables a rider to enhance his performances; c/ if, in an assumed two-rider race, both riders 
dope the final ranking remains unchanged compared to a situation without doping; and d/ if one of the 
two riders is caught, he will never denounce the other rider for being doped as well. Cycling the latter 
behaviour is known as omerta or the „law of silence‟: it is forbidden to openly talk about doping. In 
such a prisoner‟s dilemma, it can be shown that doping is a dominant strategy which means that it is 
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always much more profitable for both riders to dope. The game theoretic literature about doping has 
also proposed several new anti-doping policy recommendations, all focused on providing riders 
reduced incentives to use doping. Eber and Thépot (1999) advocate lower spreads between the prizes 
(which is in conflict with tournament theory), fewer races, improved testing and better prevention. 
Berentsen (2002) suggests a new rank-based sanctioning mechanism.  
 
However, as long as the wrong incentives are given to riders also these solutions will be of little help 
in the fight against doping. We therefore suggest a revolutionary anti-doping regulation in cycling 
where the riders themselves lose interest in the use of doping, or even have an interest not to dope 
even when other competitors do. This can be realized by the use of appropriate incentives. The 
suggested scheme below is to some extent in line with Breivik‟s (1992) views, and elaborates on the 
„drug diary system‟ put forward in Bird and Wagner (1997), and on Andreff (2012). The device would 
work as follows: 
 At the start of the cycling season, all riders (in accordance with their doctors) must register 
compulsory the list of all doping substances and techniques they plan or, when necessary, want to use 
over the whole season. Such a doping diary is secret to the other riders. It could, for example, be 
deposited in the hands of each rider‟s lawyer or with the UCI. Riders fully commit themselves to stick 
to the self-declared list of doping products. 
 If,during the season, a rider is tested positive for having taken products listed in his diary, no 
sanction applies. 
 However, if a rider is tested positive for having taken products not on this list, the sanction is 
extremely severe, for example a lifetime ban from professional cycling. A severe sanction is needed 
because not only did the rider use doping, he also cheated and blurred the transparency required for 
this scheme to be efficient. Because the rider does not want to comply with the rules of the game, he is 
excluded from professional cycling forever. 
 If a rider is performing extremely well, other riders who are suspicious (anyone of them, under the 
precondition that they are at least two) are allowed to ask the rider (or his lawyer or the UCI) to unveil 
his doping diary in order to check whether the rider complies with it. 
 If it appears from (4) that the suspected rider does not comply with his doping diary, just like under 
(3) he is banned for life from professional cycling.  
 If it appears from (4) that the suspected rider does comply with his doping diary, the two or more 
claiming riders have to admit that the suspected rider either is definitely stronger than they are during 
this season or that his doping diary is more efficient or better programmed than their own. 
 As a result of this scheme, in particular at the beginning of such a regulation when there may be 
many claims against successful riders, other riders would have an incentive to copy the unveiled 
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doping diary of the winners. This would trigger three beneficial incentives. First, step by step a doping 
norm (diary) will prevail in the whole peloton, a typical story of social norm formation. All riders will 
start to use the same most efficient or best conceived doping programme. Second, because of this 
social norm formation, riders will soon realize that the differential and artificial competitive advantage 
of hidden doping is limited and short-lived. Third, the omerta system will vanish because the best 
doping programme will be publicly known to and consequently openly used by all riders once the 
most performing doping diaries of suspected winners are unveiled.  
 Once riders are convinced that doping becomes useless as soon as doping substances and 
techniques are no longer differential between riders, it will not be very difficult to convince them that 
a same optimal doping recipe does not imply „the more the better‟. Step by step, the optimal doping 
programme could be downgraded and freed from its most health threatening substances. In the long 
run, with the riders‟ consent only the safest stimulating products, necessary in a hard and demanding 
sport such as cycling, would be maintained in the programme.  
 
Moreover, such anti-doping regulation features an incentive scheme where each rider is not interested 
in more and more doping for himself, but instead is interested in benefiting from a competitor‟s 
decision to over-dope beyond his declared programme. To illustrate this point, imagine a four-rider 
racing circuit that operates under the above regulation. It will produce the following incentive scheme: 
(a) At the beginning of the season, rider A is more or better doped than riders B, C and D. He wins all 
the races (100%). 
(b) In such situation, B, C and D will ask A to unveil his doping diary. Assume that A is complying 
with his diary. Other riders will then also adopt it and the four riders will share the wins (25% each). 
(c) If rider A, in order to keep his initial advantage, decides after a while to cheat and over-dope 
beyond his self-declared diary, then he would again temporarily win 100% of the races, instead of 
25%. As a result, B, C and D would again ask to unveil the doping diary of A. The anti-doping test 
would show that A did not comply with his doping diary and the rider would be banned for life from 
cycling. At the end of the day, the three remaining riders would share the wins (33% each). 
(d) Having learned from rider A‟s poor experience, B, C and D probably would not cheat on their own 
diaries and would be satisfied with 33% of all wins (instead of the initial 0 and the subsequent 25%). If 
however, by chance, one of them does cheat according to his doping diary, the two other will again 
intervene and will now share 50% each. 
 
With the suggested regulation, an over-doped rider can increase his overall share of wins only 
temporarily, i.e. until the others ask have his doping diary unveiled. With regulation-embedded 
incentives, a rider cannot expect to increase his share in wins in a durable way when he over-dopes. 
He can expect a share increase though when competitors over-dope beyond their diary. The outcome is 
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that each rider‟s interest is to let the others over-dope and yield a higher share in wins from their 
exclusion. The incentive scheme is efficient and works in the right direction. Each rider becomes 
unwilling to over-dope or cheat whatever the others do and benefits in terms of wins from the wrong 
over-doping strategy possibly adopted by competitors. Doping thus shows a self-defeating strategy 
and will ultimately be rejected by most riders.  
 
Should one be optimistic about the above-suggested anti-doping regulation? For certain, it must not be 
considered to be a miracle solution. But the proposal at least focuses on a crucial point that could 
possibly be elaborated a bit further in forthcoming studies: the incentive scheme must convince riders 
that as soon as doping diaries are not differential between riders, doping is no longer a strategy that 
enables them to win more than their natural ability warrants. It may happen that there will be 
significant transition costs between the current anti-doping system and the one proposed here. In the 
first periods of the new regulation enforcement, some riders may feel or assume that the best 
performing doping programme is the most overloaded one. These riders might use substances 
dangerous to their health or life. If this assumption reveals to be true, they will soon be copied by other 
riders and lose their temporary comparative advantage. If on the contrary the assumption were to be 
wrong, or after a temporary increase in the number of sicknesses and deaths in the peloton (a sort of 
transition crisis between the two anti-doping systems, the hard price to pay for adopting the second 
one), all riders would be convinced that the best or optimal doping programme is in no way the most 
comprehensive or dangerous one in terms. It might be difficult though to convince stakeholders in 
cycling to enforce such a new regulation. Although riders would probably soon understand the 
mechanics of the embedded incentive scheme, they might be more concerned about the short-term 
effects of such a scheme on their health, i.e. when dangerous substances are put on the doping diary 
list (and subsequently used) by a large number of riders. But significant obstacles might also come 
from cycling governing bodies such as the UCI, Tour de France organisers ASO, and so on. They 
might especially fear the transparency about doping practices in the peloton that would result under 
such a regulation and its impact on the image (and thus the economic value) of cycling. Why not try to 
convince them as well that the good incentives that the proposed scheme creates are always preferable 
to the current bad incentives? 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Tour de France is one of the most popular and attractive sport events in the world. It attracts 
millions of people along the roads and reaches a global TV audience. This results from its nice design 
and appropriate management, the fact it is a product that is supplied for free, an acceptable fitness with 
the prerequisites of tournament theory, and a modern model of finance linking its sporting success 
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with TV rights revenues. However, the Tour success story is not decisively associated with an 
excellent competitive balance. A new metrics of the latter, adapted to the team sport dimension of 
cycling, exhibits that each Tour de France is basically imbalanced while its dynamic competitive 
balance over the years is much better. Already for a long time but especially since 1998 does the Tour 
de France has to deal with doping scandals and rider disqualifications, although so far this did not 
harm spectator and TV viewership interest for the Tour. However, the long term credibility of the Tour 
is still at stake. From this point of view, an innovative, more efficient and perhaps controversial anti-
doping regulation including incentives not to dope is developed here. 
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Table x.A1 Team average time per rider in the Tour de France expressed as the time lag behind the fastest team  
 
Teams 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AG2R Prévoyance 54'17" (7) 5'18" (8) 19'27" (7) 43'19" (8) 23'04'' (8) 35'36'' (8) 39'24'' (7) 
Agritubel 1h47'08" (6) 1h01'27" (5) 16'02" (6)     
Skil / Argos Shimano   2h05'39" (6)   1h 53'17" (6) 1h57'09'' (8) 
Astana no one (0)   18'54" (7) 1h08'15" (8) 1h00'15'' (7) 34'34'' (7) 1h28'48'' (5) 
Barloworld 1h38'23" (8) 1h08'04" (4)      
BMC    1h09'52" (7) 38'38'' (9) 13'05'' (9) 41'04'' (8) 
Bouygues Telecom / Europcar 1h27'55" (7) 53'08" (8) 1h01'34" (9) 51'37" (9) 46'47'' (8) 32'21' (7) 1h04'39'' (8) 
Caisse d'Epargne / Movistar BEST (8) 38'57" (8) 36'03" (7) BEST (9) 1h02'24'' (7) 10'43'' (6) 17'04'' (8) 
Cervélo   1h11'35" (8) 1h37'48" (8)    
Cofidis no one (0) 46'22" (8) 1h09'05" (9) 51'06" (7) 48'58'' (9) 1h37'50'' (7) 37'25'' (5) 
Crédit Agricole 1h38'41" (8) 58'18" (7)      
Discovery Channel 13'47" (8)       
Euskaltel-Euskadi 25'16" (8) 30'36" (9) 26'54" (4) 33'42" (7) 12'53'' (6) 38'33'' (5) 56'27'' (7) 
Française des Jeux 1h55'24" (7) 1h16'09" (7) 1h05'17" (7) 1h18'02" (8) 29'09'' (7) 33'14'' (8) 54'37'' (6) 
Garmin  1h04'23" (8) 58'33" (9) 1h09'42" (6) 22'23'' (8) 1h 22'40'' (6) 36'54'' (5) 
Gerolsteiner 1h39'02" (9) 1h27'48" (6)      
Katusha   1h03'55" (7) 1h08'30" (7) BEST (5) 35'21'' (7) 43'50" (9) 
Lampre 1h12'39" (8) 1h04'38" (7) 1h50'33" (6) 1h53'38" (8) 42'28'' (8) 38'28'' (4) 58'42'' (6) 
Liquigas / Cannondale 1h18'52" (8) 53'42" (7) 59'23" (8) 1h05'16" (9) 33'26'' (9) 38'27'' (9) 1h43'38'' (6) 
Leopard Trek     37'' (9)   
Lotto 58'23" (7) 58'28" (9) 42'12" (9) 9'24" (7) 44'06'' (6) 1h 01'43'' (9) 1h57'51'' (6) 
Milram 1h53'30" (7) 50'44" (9) 1h07'31" (8) 1h28'17" (7)    
Orica GreenEdge      30'31'' (8) 2h02'20'' (8) 
Quick Step 1h26'59" (9) 1h16'54" (7) 1h13'47" (6) 41'19" (8) 32'57'' (7) 48'56'' (7) 45'47'' (9) 
Rabobank / Belkin 1h12'57" (6) 23'03" (8) 55'17" (8) 27'31" (8) 18'54'' (6) 34'39'' (4) 1h37'46'' (9) 
RadioShack    12'03" (8) 17'32'' (5) BEST (6) 3'55'' (9) 
Saunier Duval / Footon Servetto 1h03'08" (6) no one (0)  1h09'39" (4)    
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Saxo Bank / CSC 20'34" (7) BEST (8) BEST (8) 1h08'07" (8) 35'14'' (9) 1h19'05'' (9) BEST (8) 
Sojasun     1h05'59'' (9) 1h12'56'' (8) 1h17'11'' (7) 
Sky    54'11" (8) 18'54'' (8) 20'06" (8) 58'41'' (7) 
T. Mobile / HTC Columbia 1h15'16" (6) 47'42" (8) 1h11'55" (9) 1h06'42" (6) 13'37'' (9)   
Vacansoleil     19'07'' (6) 43'41'' (4) 1h15'02'' (6) 
 
Between brackets: the number of riders of the team finishing the Tour de France. 
 
